Sunday, 20 August 2006
By Roy Bacon
BASRA — The senior British Soldier in Basra says progress towards stability in the region is slowed by complex tribal loyalties, but hostility is not universal and commerce can help.
As commander of the 20th Armoured Brigade, Brig. James Everard can be seen as the most powerful tribal leader in southern Iraq. In a country where weapons win more arguments than debate, the troops under his control earn him great respect. But Everard prefers to use diplomacy, dialogue and training to achieve lasting success.
In an office at Basra Air Station, among maps, books on guerrilla warfare and an Aladdin’s lamp -- he says he has resisted the temptation to bring out the genie -- the Brigadier explained the challenge of bringing disparate groups together for the greater good of the community.
"You have to remember that we’re very different from Baghdad,” he said. "There’s no-one here who wants to overturn the government. They just want a bigger slice of political power and the trappings that go with it."
That does not mean the security situation is resolved. People are murdered on the streets, victims of tribal feuds, religious sectarianism, terrorism or simple criminal activity. And there's no doubt things have got more difficult recently.
Everard admits his troops are now far more cautious when moving around the area then when they first arrived. But he also said there is less need for British soldiers to be on the streets, because Iraq's own police and military are doing much more of the work.
So what is it like walking around Basra city these days?
"It's a bit like going to a football match in England wearing the wrong shirt. If you catch the mood right, people don't see anything wrong with you. If you catch the mood wrong, you could be in trouble very quickly," Everard explained.
Regardless of who is doing the policing, a solution to the power struggles and violence will demand far more than shows of force.
"The solution is a political one," said Everard. "What you need is a government in Iraq which is going to give a lead of clear determination, strength and moral validity. And we need them to establish boundaries. There are people down here who simply don't see themselves as beholden to the rule of law."
"You find someone who's very good, and you invest in him heavily, but he's recognized as very good, and then taken elsewhere. You can imagine the frustration for a unit which spent six months building up a cohesive police station around the chief of police and his key deputy who are on-side, progressive and helpful. Then you go in one day to find they've both been promoted and taken to Baghdad.”
Such complications take on added significance in dealing with the tribal structure.
"Links are everything," explained Everard. "If you're a politician your loyalty will be to your political party. But you'll also be loyal to your tribe, and, through marriages, have secondary loyalties to other tribes.
"We're always slightly surprised when people are reluctant to make what we would deem a quick or logical decision, and it’s often because, although they know what the decision is going to achieve, they have to work out what the impact is going to be in terms of tribe, politics and wealth."
He compared Iraq to his experience in the Balkans, where the prevailing warlord culture meant any compromise was seen as weakness.
"People haven't been exposed to the way democracy is meant to work. It’s a question of dialogue, consensus, compromise, and the powerful respecting the rights of the minority. But there are an awful lot of people who really don’t get it at all."
And while winning the battle for minds is essential, the methods used are not ideological - they are very practical bread-and-butter ones, he said.
"Through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other structures we’re trying to tempt inward investment and get employment-generating commerce off the ground. We recognize that many of the people who are picking up guns are young, unemployed and bored, and therefore ripe for recruitment into some of these (insurgent) organizations."
There has been concrete progress in some areas.
Everard views the handing back of Muthanna province to Iraqi control as highly significant, and predicted that Dhi Qar and Maysan provinces could be handed back by the end of the year. That, he said, raises the question of what to do with the resources freed up by the process.
"The big decision people will have to make in the future is whether to take your dividend elsewhere, or to reinvest it. The temptation will be to put those troops elsewhere. But actually, if you're going to finish this off, you ought to reinvest them here."
Everard is under no illusions about the difference he can make during his brief time in charge.
"It's a long-term game," he said. "You come down here wanting to change the world. But you realize that your seven months is part of a much larger game plan. If you can make your slice of the Iraqi Army or the Border Enforcement Agency or the Police better and stronger, that's job done. That's achievement."
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